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The integration of communication protocols into transport systems is a much adored research area today. Much of seminal work
has been reported on the topic of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) in the recent years. Many advanced techniques have been
garnered to improve online communication and to promote the security, comfort, and eﬃciency of ITS. Of primary importance
to the eﬀective application of ITS is the communication protocol used. A fascinating development is that the yesterday’s Global
System forMobile Communication protocol is being replaced by the Universal Mobile Telecommunication System protocol, which
is the third-generation mobile technology. This article attempts to identify a suitable communication system for ITS applications.
It is impracticable to substantially modify the original UMTS-IMS-AKA protocol which is in practice because it can disturb the
operation of the current system, and thus we explore other possibilities through this research. We investigate a novel protocol to
make the original UMTS-IMS-AKA protocol compliant with ITS as well as adaptable into the current UMTS protocol.
Copyright © 2009 Hsia-Hung Ou et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. Introduction
According to the US Department of Transportation, “Intelli-
gent transportation systems (ITS) encompass a broad range
of wireless and wire line communications-based informa-
tion and electronics technologies. When integrated into
the transportation system’s infrastructure, and in vehicles
themselves, these technologies relieve congestion, improve
safety and enhance American productivity” [1]. To put
it simpler, a vehicle’s computer integrates the systems for
information, communications and vehicle detection, as well
as encompasses the technology needed to carry out these
processes. Of the many diﬀerent applications of ITS, a
select few are as follows: (1) it improves the interaction
between people, cars, roads, and transportation systems; (2)
it promotes security, eﬃciency, and comfort in conveyance
systems, and reduces the impact of transportation upon the
environment; (3) it provides a diverse range of services, such
as travel and traﬃcmanagement, public transportationman-
agement, electronic payment services, commercial vehicle
operations, emergency management, advanced vehicle safety
systems, information management, and maintenance and
constructionmanagement [2]. Amuch simplified and logical
model of ITS is illustrated in Figure 1 [3]. The research on
ITS is too vast to be covered in a single article like ours.
Thus, this article covers only a small part of the issues
surrounding ITS. Our focus is especially on the issues in
communication.
1.1. Characteristics of ITS. Signals are delivered to the diﬀer-
ent elements of ITS with the help of the communications
infrastructure. The communications infrastructure consists
of an array of diverse systems, which may be classified
into wired networks and wireless networks. These networks
may be either public or private, such as public land mobile
networks, personal communication networks, public land
mobile communications systems, private networks, packet
switched data networks, integrated services digital networks,
public switched telephone networks, and broadcast net-
works. These network forms should have the following
characteristics so as to be suitable for ITS [4]: (1) support
communication services including: voice, data, image, video,
and signaling; (2) accommodate a wide variety of terminals,
for example, fixed, portable mobile, and in-vehicle mobile;
(3) preserve upward/downward terminal compatibility; (4)
allow mobile and fixed users to utilize the services without
geographical barriers (i.e., seamless communication); (5)
provide service flexibility so that any combination of services








































































Figure 2: Communication services hierarchy.
may be used; (6) make eﬃcient and economical use of
the spectrum; (7) provide user authentication and billing
functions; (8) provide varied degrees of network security that
preserve user privacy; (9) have modular structures that allow
the systems to start from small and simple configurations and
then grow as needed in size and complexity; (10) generally
use open architectures that permit easy introduction of
advanced technology and support new applications.
Since communication services involve exchanging infor-
mation between diﬀerent systems, it is important to integrate
the diﬀerent types of communications systems rather than
design an exclusive one. The hierarchical structure for
communication services is as shown in Figure 2 [4].
1.2. MANET and VANET. A major part of current research
concerning the communications network in transport sys-
tems surrounds Vehicle Ad hoc NETwork (VANET) [4–10],
VANET focuses on messaging, broadcasting, and multi-
casting, which many think are services diﬃcult to be
implemented or accomplished with the existing telecommu-
nications techniques, namely GSM and UMTS. One of the
key objects of this research is to identify a communication
system that is suitable for ITS. Our focus is to extend on the
existing UMTS-AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement)
protocol with a view to making it compliant with ITS.
Although the ITS communication environment is classi-
fied into wired and wireless networks, much of development
bottlenecks surround the wireless side. The current wireless
networks mainly take IEEE 802.11 (especially 802.11p is
still active by IEEE 802.11 working group and scheduled to
be published in July 2008) as the standard. Infrastructure
and Ad hoc are widely used. All mobile nodes working
within the infrastructure must connect to the access point
for transmission. Unlike the infrastructure mode, devices in
the Ad hoc mode do not need access points for transmission.
Ad hoc relies on point-to-point networks that they constitute
along with the members of mobile nodes. One such network
using Ad hoc framework is MANET. The ITS communica-
tion environment can be simply classified into “car-to-car
communication” (C2CC, or intervehicle communication,
IVC) and “car-to-infrastructure communication (C2IC)”
[11, 12]. The Ad hoc network is most suitable for C2CC. An
improved version of MANET called VANET has also been
proposed [13, 14].
Its security architecture can be found in [15–25]. VANET
has five characteristics that meet the needs of intervehicle
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communication: high mobility, large number of nodes,
no centralized infrastructure, user privacy, and no user
interaction. VANET must suit increased movement, more
nodes, and higher computational overhead (since its mobile
node is the vehicle’s computer rather than a PDA or a
mobile phone). VANET can deliver information over the Ad
hoc network formed with neighboring vehicles. Although
VANET was designed exclusively for ITS, it comes with
innate drawbacks. One is the scalability program [4]. In
a large and distributed environment, scalability is crucial.
This is especially the case for vehicles that travel very far
apart from each other, in which case signal delivery cannot
continue between them. Additionally, vehicle obstruction
can lead to increased bandwidth overhead. Furthermore,
the ease of disclosure of sensitive information over wireless
networks [5, 10], general privacy management [9, 26, 27],
and location program [28, 29] are subjects relating to VANET
that must be urgently resolved.
1.3. Communication Types in ITS. The ITS communications
infrastructure can be classified into two major types: wireless
and wired communication systems. Wireless communica-
tion can be further classified into wide-area and short-
range communication systems. Short-range communica-
tion has two subdivisions: dedicated short-range (formerly
vehicle-to-roadside) and vehicle-to-vehicle communications
[30].
Wide-area communication systems are currently used
for cellular phone communication, and short-range com-
munication systems are used in VANET. At present, cellular
phone communication systems are very widely used, and
network coverage is nearly universal. It is much easier to
use the existing cellular phone networks and improve upon
them rather than develop a new VANET. The cellular phone
network is reliable and will continue to evolve andmature. In
addition to being popular and stable, the benefit of cellular
phone networks is that the infrastructure is already in place.
However, VANET will still be needed for vehicle-to-vehicle
communication.
1.4. The Rests of the Article. The focus of this research is
on developing a cell phone-based system to replace VANET
and thus eliminate the bottleneck that has developed with
regard to improving this form of ITS communication. The
remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we review the UMTS technology, AKA protocol, and MBMS
(Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service). In Section 3, we
extend the UMTS-IMS-AKA (IMS: IP Multimedia System)
protocol which is based on a group key. This proposed
protocol is compliant with ITS. In addition, we also propose
a dedicated vehicle-to-vehicle communication system in this
section. Related discussion and analysis will be presented in
Section 4. Finally, we give our conclusions in Section 5.
2. Relevant UMTS Technology
UMTS is the third-generation (3G) mobile telecommuni-
cations technology that evolved from GSM of the second
generation (2G). UMTS is widely compatible than GSM
and has thus gradually replaced it to become the most
ideal system for mobile phone communication. Compared
with GSM, UMTS contains bigger bandwidth to allow
larger downloads and uses reliable safety mechanisms.
Its convenience has been widely appreciated, and thus it
proliferated all over the globe. GSM makes two types
of services: CS (circuit switched) service and PS (packet
switched) service. CS service is responsible for traditional
speech telecommunication. PS service provides the forerun-
ner’s packet switching to support IP. It has the security
characteristics [31] required by ITS environments, and can
attain the goals outlined earlier. UMTS is also a wide-area
wireless infrastructure that can support the delivery of a
large number of packets as well as many broadcasts or
multicast information. Through a special BS (basic station),
it can also support short-range information transfer. In
contrast, dedicated wireless systems are not easily supported
by UMTS. However, we think our technique can accomplish
this. In this section, we first introduce the UMTS-AKA
protocol [32], the UMTS-IMS-AKA protocol [33], and the
UMTS-MBMS protocol [34, 35]. In the following section, we
describe how they are suitable to an ITS environment.
2.1. UMTS-AKA and UMTS-IMS-AKA Protocols. The
UMTS-AKA protocol [32] is an authentication and key
agreement protocol. It is equipped by the 3GPP (3rd
Generation Partnership Project). The objective is to meet the
requirements of UMTS so that the mobile device can stay
secure both during the authentication process and during
the telecommunication session. As shown in Figure 3, the
UMTS-AKA protocol has two phases. One is the phase
of distribution of authentication vectors from HE (Home
Environment) to SN (Service Network). The other is the
phase of authentication and key establishment. Table 1
defines the relevant symbols.
When an MS enters into the service domain of the SN,
or VLR (Visitor Location Register), for the first time, it is
executing the phase of distribution of authentication vectors
from HE to SN and completing a registration procedure.
This procedure, in addition to making MS’s HE aware of the
MS location, can let the SN obtain the AVs (Authentication
Vectors) from MS’s HE (for authentication with the MS
in the future). AVs include the n set of authentication
vectors and can provide n time authentication between MS
and SN. If MS is always registered and it wants to use a
service in SN, it can execute the phase of authentication
and key establishment leading to mutual authentication.
Thus they confirm the legitimacy of each other. In this
protocol, the basis of authentication is a secret key that is
shared between MS’s HE and MS. Through USIM (Universal
Subscriber Identity Module) protection, this key can be
recognized only by MS and its HE. SN and HE may be
diﬀerent system operators; this characteristic helps UMTS to
expand its service range (and thus make our application ITS-
compatible). Once authenticated, both parties can establish
the cipher key and the integer key. Using these keys allows
their messages to remain private.
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Table 1: Symbols used in UMTS-AKA-protocol/UMTS-IMS-AKA-protocol.
MS, SN, HE Mobile Station, Service Network, Home Environment
VLR,HLR Visitor Location Register, Home Location Register
AuC, SQN Authentication Centre, Sequence Number
USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
AV, AUTN Authentication Vector, Authentication Token
K Secret Key which share between USIM and AuC
MAC Messages Authentication Code
AMF Authentication Management Field
Rand, RES Random Number, User Response
XRES Expected User Response
CK, IK, AK Cipher Key, Integer Key, Authentication Key
f1∼f5 Authentication and Key Generation Function
UE User Equipment
IMPI, IMPU IP Multimedia Private Identity , IP Multimedia Public Identity
P-CSCF Proxy Call Service Control Function
I-CSCF Intergating Call Service Control Function
S-CSCF Service Call Service Control Function
P-CSCF Proxy Call Service Control Function
UMTS is a huge system constituted by many subsys-
tems to keep abreast of the demands. The UMTS-AKA
protocol is the main mechanism for authentication and
key establishment. The diﬀerent subsystems operate a bit
diﬀerently because of varied demands; however, the same
concept is reused for the IP multimedia core network
subsystems, where it is called the UMTS-IMS-AKA protocol
[33]. Figure 4 illustrates this procedure, while Table 1 defines
the relevant symbols.
Basically UMTS-IMS-AKA and UMTS-AKA are alike
and merely run in diﬀerent environments. IMPI (IP Mul-
timedia Private Identity) corresponds to IMSI (Interna-
tional Mobile Subscriber Identity); IMPU (IP Multimedia
PUblic Identity) to TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber
Identity); UE (User Equipment) to MS; P-CSCF (Proxy Call
Service Control Function) to I-CSCF (Interrogating Call
Service Control Function); S-CSCF (Service Call Service
Control Function) to SN; HSS (Home Subscriber Server)
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to HE—from all these, one can find that UMTS-IMS-AKA
and UMTS-AKA are alike with regard to their logic and
concepts. Although the method of calculating the parameters
of UTMS-AKA and IMS-AKA are identical, their parameters
are transported in slightly diﬀerent ways. Since messages are
delivered on IP networks in the UMTS-IMS-AKA protocol,
additional parameters must be developed.
2.2. UMTS Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service. The
MBMS (Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service) [34, 35]
has been standardized in the 3GPP. It provides a point-to-
multipoint service of transmitting multimedia data via the
existing UMTS cellular networks. MBMS oﬀers two service
modes: broadcast mode and multicast mode. Both of them
can share the same data from a single source to multiple
recipients. Figure 5 illustrates their architecture [35]. The
security architecture of MBMS has been defined elsewhere
[36].
BM-SC is a Broadcast/Multicast Service Centre which is
a source for MBMS data, or scheduling and receiving MBMS
data from third parties. It oﬀers an interface for content
providers to deliver the requested data to allocated users.
SGSN performs user individual service control functions and
provides MBMS data transmissions to UTRAN/GERAN. It
also provides support for intra- and intermobility procedures
and indicates its MBMS support to the UE. Moreover, SGSN
maintains a single connection with the source of MBMS data
and concentrates all users of the same MBMS service into a
single MBMS service. The role of GGSN within the MBMS
architecture is that of a gateway for MBMS data. It links the
tunnels from SGSN withMBMS data source via IP multicast.
With respect to the security, BM-SC uses theHTTP digest
authentication mechanism [37, 38] to authenticate the UEs,
and the GBA (Generic Bootstrapping Architecture) [39] to
establish the secret share key with the UEs. HTTP digest
authentication mechanism is defined in RFC 2617. UMTS-
MBMS is specified in the clause “procedures using the
bootstrapped Security Association” [37]. It is run between
BM-SC and ME just as the UMTS-IMS-AKA protocol is
executed between SN and MS, and their methods are the
same in essence. In order to keep the privacy of MBMS
data while conveying, four keys, MRK (MBMS Request Key),
MUK (MBMS User Key), MSK (MBMS Service Key) and
MTK (MBMS Traﬃc Key), must be established. MRK is used
to authenticate UE to BM-SC when performing key requests;
MUK is the MBMS user individual key used by BM-SC to
protect MSK transferred to UE; MSK is used to protect the
delivery ofMTK;MTK is used to decrypt the receivedMBMS
data on UE.
3. The Proposed Scheme
In mapping the ITS communication characteristics to the
existing UMTS environment the following requirements are
met.
(i) A deal of messages delivered and their contents
are public and homologous. ITS must deliver many
of messages, and the contents of the data are
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UE: user equipment
UTRAN: universal terrestrial radio access network
GERAN: GSM EDGE radio access network
SGSN: serving GPRS support node
GGSN TPF: gateway GPRS support node traffic plane function
BM-SC: broadcast multicast service centre
PLMN: public land mobile network


















Figure 5: The UMTS MBMS Architecture.
homologous. Some examples are road conditions,
multimedia, and navigation information. The pri-
mary characteristic of these messages is that they are
public and homologous. In order tomaintain fairness
and privacy, all messages must be encrypted and
conveyed. In view of this, UMTS-MBMS provides a
point-to-multipoint service for transmitting multi-
media data via existing UMTS cellular networks, but
it is not fully applicable to the ITS environment. The
MBMS is suitable for stable and continuous point-
to-multipoint relationship, which includes members
and message content. In ITS communication, vehi-
cles are fast-moving on the roads. The original
MBMS will meet two kinds of situations. One is the
fast movement caused by rapid changes in message
routing. The other is the multicasting members of the
frequent changes. These particular situations of ITS
will cause a heavy load on the MBMS.
(ii) Smaller messages delivered and their contents are pri-
vate. These messages generally suit a specific purpose,
such as paying tolls. Privacy and nonrepudiation are
necessary characteristics. The current UMTS does a
good job in this aspect. Especially IMS, a subsystem
of UMTS, provides a complete solution with packet
transmission by unicasting. With the support of the
IMS, UMTS can provide full service to ITS in this
respect.
(iii) Messages are exchanged between two parties as in
vehicle-to-vehicle communication. This is accom-
plished by vehicles detecting each other and com-
municating directly. Currently, UMTS has no related
technique to support this communication. Since
UMTS is already a popular technique, modifying
this protocol substantially can endanger its com-
patibility. It is not our intention doing so; rather
we have merely extended and improved the existing
protocol to make the UMTS fully applicable to
the ITS. Considering the above needs, this article
proposes two expansion protocols to overcome the
shortcomings in the original UMTS. One is a group
key extension of the UMTS-IMS-AKA protocol. The
concept of this protocol is to combine MBMS and
IMS into a more streamlined AKA protocol to solve
the bottleneck of data transfer. Another is a vehicle-
to-vehicle communication system for UMTS. This is
to fill the gaps in UMTS in favor of ITS. This protocol
shall make possible that vehicles directly exchange
messages under the framework of UMTS.
3.1. Group Key Extension of the UMTS-IMS-AKA Protocol.
IMS is an extension subsystem of the UMTS to support IP-
based multimedia services. It has been designed to support
the point-to-point connection with unicasting transmis-
sion. Moreover, MBMS facilitates the point-to-multipoint
transmission of broadcast and multicast. The earlier release
of the 3GPP standard did not provide the integration of
IMS and MBMS. Although IMS and MBMS are separate
from the system, MBMS must be used with IMS. This
will cause duplication of resources wasted. Fortunately, it
has been considered and integrated in the latest release.
Moreover, some reports [40–42] provided the integration
of IMS and MBMS. The release and the literatures favor
the integration of their functionalities and not their security
mechanism. However, in the ITS environment, vehicles move
so fast that special focus need to be given to the response
and performance on communication. For this reason, the
proposed protocol attempts to expand on the existing IMS-
AKA protocol to enable it to support the group key on
MBMS. In addition, considering the compatibility of the
original system, we try to minimize the movement of
integration.
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First, observe the special situations for MBMS in ITS
environment and classify them into two kinds. One is the
transmission of multimedia, such as audio, video, or movie.
This kind of transmission is very suitable for the original
UMTS-MBMS because the source is fixed and the connection
is continuing. Another one is the transmission of messages,
such as traﬃc information, travel information, traﬃc control
messages, and traﬃc management messages. This kind of
transmission has a feature that the contents of the messages
are regional. That is, the contents of the messages change
with the location of the vehicle. The original UMTS-MBMS
is unable to meet this demand because of the following.
(1) The information source is not a fixed point but
the distribution is. On the UMTS-MBMS, all the
multicast/broadcast messages concentrate on BM-
SC and then are forwarded to the recipient. This
will result in round-trip transmission that messages
provided from the vehicle’s location to the BM-SC
return to the vehicles in the region.
(2) Vehicles quickly move through diﬀerent service net-
work coverage. On the UMTS-MBMS, the problem
of signal transmission can be solved through cor-
recting the routing tables [34]. Two possible options
for data path exist for this case. Option 1 is via the
original SRNC (Serving Radio Network Controller).
Option 2 is via a new DRNC (Drift Radio Network
Controller). The original SRNC is a dedicated point
to forward the signal to the vehicles in the new
location. It has the advantage of easy operation,
but it increases communication delay. Via a new
DRNC, BM-SC will define a new multicast signaling
channel for vehicles to receive data directly. This can
reduce some signaling complexity but increases the
diﬃculty in operation. Both of them will increase
communication delay and diﬃculties in delivery.
For the above reasons, this article proposes to combine
a group key with the UMTS-IMS protocol to making it
compatible with ITS. The proposal, however, does not
aﬀect compatibility with the original protocol since it only
increases some parameters with the original behind. Figure 6
outlines our proposal.
Our protocol is very similar to the original IMS-AKA
protocol; an obvious characteristic is that our proposal joins
a vehicle key, VK, and a random number, SN. However,VK
is an exclusive key allocated to each vehicle that enters the
P-CSCF service range; it is used to protect the delivery of
GK, and GK is a group key used to decrypt the received data
on the vehicle. Also, SN is a random number selected by the
vehicle; it is used to generate VK. Their relationship is
VK = f vk(SN). (1)
Here f v is a key-generating function, like the f∗ on the
UMTS. It may replace f 3 or f 4 on the UMTS. The details
of our proposal are as follows.
(1) The vehicle (as UE) sends its IMPI, IMPU, and a
random number, SN, to the P-CSCF. IMPI/IMPU is
used in the same manner as IMSI/TMSI—to identify
vehicles. A vehicle can only have only one IMPI
but can be assigned many IMPU so as to hide its
movements. After that the vehicle calculates VK =
f vk(SN) and stores the results for future use to
decrypt the encrypted GK.
(2) P-CSCF sends messages via I-CSCF to the S-CSCF.
When S-CSCF receives the messages, it first checks
in a database to see if it has unused authentication
vectors with the vehicle. If yes, it jumps to Step 6;
otherwise, S-CSCF sends the IMPI, m, and SN to
the vehicle’s HSS requesting m sets of authentication
vectors.
(3) After HSS has received the request from S-CSCF,
HSS uses the secure key K which is shared between
the vehicle’s ISIM (IP Multimedia Services Identity
Module) and the HSS to compute the following ( f∗
is the key-generating function [43–45]):
(i) randomly select a RAND,
(ii) cipher key, CK = f 3K (RAND),
(iii) integrity key, IK = f 4K (RAND),
(iv) anonymity key, AK = f 5K (RAND),
(v) expected response, XRES = f 2K (RAND),
(vi) message authentication code, MAC =
f 1K (SQN||RAND||AMF), where SQN is a
sequence number that maintains consistency
between vehicle’s ISIM and its HSS; AMF
(authentication and key management files) is
used to indicate the algorithm and key used to
generate a particular authentication vector,




(ix) repeat the above step until m sets of AVs are
produced,
(x) vehicle key, VK = f vk(SN).
(4) HSS delivers m sets of AVs and VK to S-CSCF once
the computation is complete.
(5) S-CSCF receives the authentication vector and makes
use of it in follow-up connection.
(6) The step after here is the same as in the UMTS-
IMS-AKA protocol. S-CSCF retrieves a tuple of
unused authentication vectors from the AV, and sends
(IMPI,RAND,AUTN,CK,IK) via I-CSCF to P-CSCF.
After that P-CSCF sends (IMPI,RAND,AUTN) as the
challenge to the vehicle.
(7) Upon receiving (IMPI,RAND,AUTN), the vehicle
computes the following:
(i) cipher key, XCK = f 3K (RAND),
(ii) integrity key, XIK = f 4K (RAND),
(iii) anonymity key, XAK = f 5K (RAND),
(iv) response, RES = f 2K (RAND),
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Figure 6: The proposed IMS-AKA-protocol.
(v) verify the vehicle’s sequence number, SQN’
?
=(SQN⊕ AK)⊕ XAK ,
(vi) calculate XMAC= f 1K(SQN’‖RAND‖AMF),
(vii) verify XMAC ?= MAC.
(8) If the identification is correct, the vehicle delivers
(IMPI,RES) to P-CSCF, and P-CSCF sends it via I-
CSCF to the S-CSCF.
(9) S-CSCF compares RES and XRES in AV to make sure
the vehicle is a legal user.
(10) If the identification is correct, the S-CSCF delivers
a message AUTHOK via I-CSCF to P-CSCF and the
vehicle. After that P-CSCF can initiate communica-
tion with the vehicle by the CK and IK.
(11) When S-CSCF sends a group of messages (as multi-
casting/broadcasting) to the vehicle, it encrypts the
group key, GK, with that of the vehicle’s, VK, and
then sends to the vehicle via the I-CSCF and P-
CSCF. After receiving the encrypted GK, the vehicle
decrypts with the VK, and gets the GK to decrypt the
encrypted group messages.
Upon completing the above steps, the vehicle and the
CSCF can initiate communication in two ways. Private data
is encrypted by the original IK and CK, and the group
data is encrypted by the GK. This scheme governs the
private communication provided by the original UMTS-
AKA protocol, and provides the group communication
scheme.Moreover, it can be applied to environments that use
wide-area wireless and vehicle-to-roadside communications.
3.2. Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication Systems for UMTS.
To provide a more complete scheme for ITS, we devised a
new AKA protocol to be applied to the vehicle-to-vehicle
communication systems. Figure 7 illustrates this protocol.
When neighboring vehicles want to communicate, they
must obtain the IMPU of the other party first, as in Stage
1. IMPU resembles alias that can temporarily identify the
user and can hide his true identity to achieve anonymity.
In this stage, vehicles obtain the IMPU of the other party
by other techniques such as sensor networks or wireless
networks. UMTS also provides location techniques [46] that
are helpful in this case. In Stage 2, the two parties exchange
IMPU and convert them to CSCF. Since the vehicles always
stay within the service range of the CSCF, they will pass
through Phase 1 of our IMS-AKA protocol. CSCF has already
confirmed both parties’ IMPI, and selected a meeting key,
MK, which encrypts the messages exchanged between both
parties. Then, take both parties’ VK to encrypt the MK and
send back during Stage 3. The purpose of encryptedMKwith
the respective VK is to hide the MK of both parties; so they
cannot be obtained by outside parties while allowing both
authorized parties to decrypt the encrypted MK with his VK.
We have proposed two AKA protocols that allow UMTS
to configure the ITS environment. One applies to wide-
area and vehicle-to-roadside communication systems. The
other applies to vehicle-to-vehicle communications. In other
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Ek (M) : encrypting M with key k
Dk (M) : decrypting M with key k
Figure 7: The proposed V2V-AKA-protocol.
words, our proposal helps apply the UMTS to ITS environ-
ments.
4. Discussion and Analysis
ITS has a wide range of applications, but not all of them
are currently practical. Many applications are still at the
conceptual stage. Much research has focused on Ad-hoc
networks concerning ITS communication. However, the Ad-
hoc network had some problems still to remain unresolved.
UMTS is a universal and reliable technology but does not
fully applicable to the ITS. Because such that the article
attaches importance to the realization of these applications.
we have introduced some useful characteristics to be applied
to ITS in the field of telecommunications, and we utilized
the existing UMTS techniques to support them. However, we
proposed two practical protocols to service the needs of ITS.
In this section, we will analyze and discuss the benefits
of our proposal. We will first simply reiterate the basic
characteristics of ITS communication, and then explain why
our proposal is suitable in ITS environments. In conclusion,
security is taken as a point to discuss briefly.
4.1. Property. According to the recipient of the message, ITS
wireless communication can be classified into two types.
(1) Vehicle-to-roadside communication: it indicates that
the vehicle and ITS deliver data by means of wireless
infrastructure. Generally it is the ITS that delivers
relevant data to the vehicle. Those data may regard
road conditions, video, or audio.
(2) Vehicle-to-vehicle communication: it indicates that
the relevant data is delivered between vehicles. In
this mode, one can view the vehicle as the router. It
resembles the Ad hoc network as it can automatically
search and link the neighboring vehicles to form a
topology. Moreover, neighboring vehicles also can
link themselves together to exchange messages.
ITS wireless communication can also be classified
according to the data contents.
(1) Common messages: this type of message is usually
when many vehicles transmit the same message,
such as traﬃc reports or multimedia. Some common
messages must be kept private from nonauthorized
users; only a legal user may receive them. This is due
to the fact that legal users must pay for the contents
of the data, and nonauthorized users may want to
steal it. According to the data provider, data can be
classified into two types.
(a) Content provider is the centralization. Their
data source is fixed and the connection is
continuing, such as audio, video, or movie.
(b) Content providers are the localization. Their
data source is not fixed but will follow the
vehicle location to change, such as traﬃc
information, travel information, traﬃc control
messages, or traﬃc management messages.
(2) Private messages: these must always be kept confiden-
tial.
These characteristics help us understand the suitability of
our scheme.
4.2. Realization. Currently, developments in wireless com-
munication on ITS concern an exclusive network called
VANET. VANET was constituted by an Ad-hoc network
which automatically links the neighboring vehicles to form a
topology. However, Ad-hoc is an exclusive network technique
under development. The biggest problem is that it is not
10 EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
stable. Its topology is constituted by mobile nodes (vehicle)
that may change at any time. An inherent drawback is that
vehicles that are too close or too far cannot communicate.
To solve this defect, fixed access points have been used to
strengthen the signal, since the outdoor wireless network’s
coverage is still not comprehensive. However, it will be
quite expensive to build the necessary infrastructure to
solve this problem. These problems are completely avoided
with UMTS. More importantly, its infrastructure is nearly
complete, thus avoiding the problems of lack of signal
coverage.
Seamlessly UMTS is the best platform to use with ITS. It
can support vehicle-to-roadside as well as vehicle-to-vehicle
communications when our modifications are used. The
original UMTS was supported by IMS andMBMS to transfer
private and common messages. However, when applied
to the environment of ITS, it will have some additional
considerations, especially the fast movement caused by rapid
changes in message routing and multicasting members of the
frequent changes. Both of them will cause a heavy load on
the MBMS. For this, our protocol introduces the concept of
group keys. Moreover, in the UMTS, IMS and MBMS are
two separate systems, and the MBMS must be used with the
IMS. This has caused wastage of resources and authentication
delays. For this, our protocol integrates them into a single
protocol. However, to solve the bottlenecks, our protocol
is an expansion of the existing IMS-AKA protocol using
support group key. This does not only combine IMS and
MBMS but also solves the problems of MBMS in the ITS.
Two protocols are proposed in this paper. One is an
improvement over the IMS-AKA protocol; another is a novel
V2V-AKA protocol. The improvement over the IMS-AKA
protocol was achieved by integrating a vehicle key on the
UMTS-IMS-AKA protocol. The V2V-AKA protocol is an
innovative design. It makes direct communication between
vehicles possible on the UMTS. The suitable collocation
of our IMS-AKA protocol with our V2V-AKA protocol
can get all-round development on ITS. Generally messages
delivered by our IMS-AKA protocol and interaction with
vehicles are shared with our V2V-AKA protocol. Some of
the applications can be accomplished with slight revision.
For example, ETC (Electronic Toll Collection) system can
to regard our protocol as their charging solution. In this
scenario, P-CSCF corresponds to the tollbooth. When a
vehicle passes through the tollbooth, the tollbooth sends
the authentication request to the vehicle. Our IMS-AKA
protocol can be adopted in this scenario. With our protocol,
authentication and authorization are assured, and the billing
program can also be solved.
4.3. Security Analysis. Our proposal has the structure of the
original IMS-AKA protocol and inherits its security features.
All the fundamental conditions of security [31] on the IMS-
AKA protocol are also attained in our protocol, including
anonymity and untraceability. Moreover, our protocol can
achieve three objectives (confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability) [47] of ITS to resist four general threats (deception,
disruption, usurpation, and unauthorized disclosure) [47].
Only authorized vehicles can have the secure key K and pass
the authentication and get the relational key CK, IK, and
VK. All unauthorized vehicles intercept unreadable secret
content. Moreover, as in the IMS-AKA protocol, our protocol
has the enhanced feature of mutual authentication.
On vehicle-to-roadside communication, in order to
retain compatibility with the original IMS-AKA protocol,
we have fine-tuned the original protocol. The main change
is that we have joined a vehicle key, VK. However, VK is
generated by RN and K; SN is a random number selected
by the vehicle; K is a secret key shared between the vehicle
and HSS. By the way, the vehicle has participated in the
decision of VK because SN is oﬀered by him. The advantage
is that a vehicle can very easily identify fresh VK, and prevent
a malicious attacker from stealing VK and reusing it. The
group key, GK, used for encrypting the group messages is
encrypted by VK and delivered to the corresponding vehicle.
Therefore, GK will not leak it in the process of transaction,
and group messages can also maintain secrecy.
On the vehicle-to-vehicle communication, our protocol
combines UMTS and Ad-hoc. Both the technologies rely
on the UMTS authentication mechanism that verifies the
identity of vehicles and uses the Ad-hoc network architecture
to communicate between the vehicles. It has the advantage
of UMTS’s security and Ad-hoc network’s convenience.
Moreover, vehicles know each other, and only the IMPU can
ensure the anonymity of the two sides. Using VK to encrypt
the meeting key, MK, and the transaction can guarantee that
MK will not leak during the transmission.
Keeping with these discussions, a conclusion can be
derived that our proposed is based on the original IMS-
AKA protocol and continues to develop. In our expanding
function, the random number, SN, and the secret key, k,
making the vehicle key, VK, has privacy and security. Since
the VK is secure, GK andMKprotected by VK are also secure;
therefore, our protocol is secure.
5. Conclusions
In this article, we have proposed a function for ITS wireless
communication mechanisms. Much research has focused
on Ad-hoc networks concerning ITS communication. This
article provides a new idea on how to use UMTS to replace
exclusive Ad hoc networks. To make UMTSmore suitable for
ITS, we slightly modified the UMTS-AKA protocol without
reducing its eﬀectiveness, and our results were excellent.
We will continue researching this subject in the future.
We believe this new direction can promote significant ITS
implementation.
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